Hamas attack on Israel: The problem with over relying on technology

Israel also uses biometric systems — fingerprint scanners and artificial intelligence-enabled facial recognition technology — at border crossings to verify the identity of people entering and exiting the country. The country’s security agencies utilise sophisticated algorithms and data mining techniques to analyse large volumes of data collected from various sources. This helps them identify patterns, trends, and potential security threats. These are accompanied by cyber security drills and web monitoring on a round-the-clock basis from security operation centres to monitor suspicious activities.

It seems all of these failed when they were needed the most. The Hamas killers could beat tech systems and undertake multiple tasks, from meticulous planning to execution on many fronts. They chose their dates around a major festival where the gathering would be large and people would be in festive spirit. They foxed the border perimeter security systems, shot and killed soldiers and civilians alike and took hostages. How could it go so wrong for a country that had a system that had never failed and had agile and trained manpower on the ground? While very little is known of Hamas’ capabilities in matters regarding technology or even its capabilities to dodge digital footprints, except for some cyber attacks in the past, the fact that it evaded Israel’s tech radar is intriguing. It is highly unlikely that Hamas built electronic corridors that don’t leave traces — it is almost impossible to undertake such a massive operation, that involves several personnel and multiple locations, without communicating and coordinating. So then were signals missed at some place, resulting in altering the response mechanism?

The only saving grace was the Iron Dome missile defence system, developed and deployed by the country for years to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells. It has been protecting against threats from various directions, including rockets launched from the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and other hostile entities. The Iron Dome intercepted many rockets during the current conflict. But it is not a foolproof defence system and cannot provide 100 per cent protection against all potential threats.

What went wrong then? Were digital footprints tricked or missed or did the over-reliance on tech bring in a sense of comfort and reduced alertness? Many security experts have pointed out that over-reliance on tech solutions could have been a wrong strategy for Israel. Did the lack of physical presence in Gaza hurt Israel? Both humint (human intelligence) and sigint (signals intelligence) needed a balance of planning and deployments along with the presence of security personnel. Others have argued that Israel approached Gaza casually compared to the firmness it has used in the West Bank where systems like the Blue Wolf have been deployed with competitive zeal among security units. A lot of these failures will be analysed. But for now, this is a reminder that solving problems in the real world is more crucial than over-relying on tech.

The writer is Visiting Scholar, Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University Bloomington USA and a cyber security analyst